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Kathleen M. Sullivant
On its face, a republican revival in constitutional law is a curiosity.
How could republicanism flourish in the contemporary United States?
Collective self-determination by political equals, animated by civic virtue
to seek a common good, may have been possible in a small, participatory
city-state such as Rousseau's Geneva.' But the odds are against it in
Madison's extended sphere,' which is neither homogeneous, participatory,
nor small.
Professors Sunstein and Michelman recognize this problem. But they
are not modern antifederalists, championing the decentralization of
power.' Instead, they advocate republicanism on a national scale.4 Their
solution is not politics restructured, but politics reconceived.
Sunstein and Michelman would reconceive lawmaking, even at the na-
tional level, as reasoned public dialogue or deliberation about the common
good rather than competition among private interests for self-satisfaction.
They reject the conception of politics as a marketplace for Hobbesean
rent-seekers-atomized individuals seeking to maximize through politics
the realization of their own preferences.5 They conceive politics instead as
the collective articulation of an objective common good.
This much draws on the republican tradition. But Sunstein and
Michelman innovate on that tradition in one crucial way: They argue that
the articulation of the common good is compatible with the nurturance of
t Assistant Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Richard Fallon, Mary Ann Glendon,
Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Margaret Jane Radin, Cass Sunstein, and Laurence Tribe for
valuable comments.
1. Rousseau idealized his native Geneva as a model of republican self-government. See, e.g., J.
ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in THE Frosr AND
SECOND DISCOURSES 78-90 (R. Masters ed. 1964); J. ROUSSEAU, Letter to M. D'Alembert on the
Theatre, in POLrrICS AND THE ARTS (A. Bloom trans. 1960).
2. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (arguing that
"[e]xtend[ing] the sphere" of the republic reduces its vulnerability to the oppression of "factious
combinations").
3. For an example of such a view, see Frug, The City as Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057
(1980).
4. As Michelman put it elsewhere, "if the appeal of republican vision is restricted to cases of
small, homogeneous communities, it has little contemporary significance for American constitutional
law or theory." Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Govern-
ment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 22 n.96 (1986).
5. Hobbes is the great theorist of "possessive individualism." See C. MACPHERSON, THE PoLrTI-
CAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962). Economic "rent" is the excess of revenues from
an activity over its opportunity costs. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9 (3d ed. 1986).
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"social plurality."6 They assert that the heterogeneity of social groups and
perspectives is a republican virtue, not a vice. In short, they propose a
new kind of republicanism: rainbow republicanism.
This Comment argues against rainbow republicanism and for a differ-
ent alternative to a politics of Hobbesean rent-seeking: for a conception of
politics as the interaction of groups that are more than simple aggrega-
tions of individual preferences, but less than components of a single com-
mon good. Such a conception may be labeled normative pluralism. This
conception rejects "pluralism" as Sunstein and Michelman define it:
namely, a struggle among persons who are autonomous bundles of
presocial wants. To the contrary, normative pluralism, like republicanism,
acknowledges that persons and values are forged in social interaction. But
unlike republicanism, normative pluralism rejects any quest for agreement
upon a single common good, and locates social interaction and value for-
mation principally in settings other than citizenship. Normative pluralism
thus envisions an ongoing and desirable role for groups that are social but
not public-groups intermediate between individuals and the state.
I. INTERMEDIATE GROUPS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Two sorts of "groups" divide individuals into affiliations less compre-
hensive than the state: "involuntary" groups, such as those mapped out
along lines of race, gender, ethnicity, or national origin; and "voluntary"
groups that are more freely entered and exited, such as marriages, sexual
partnerships, political parties, lobbying groups, charitable organizations,
social clubs, religions, labor unions, and corporations.
The differences between these two kinds of groups should not be over-
stated. Some apparently "voluntary" statuses-such as class, religion, or
sexual orientation-may in fact be more given than chosen.7 Exit from
some "voluntary" associations is freer than from others." And the common
fate of membership in an "involuntary" group may motivate voluntary
organization; advocacy groups for blacks' or women's rights are obvious
examples.9
Nonetheless, current constitutional law treats "involuntary" and "vol-
untary" groups quite differently. While classification on the basis of invol-
6. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1533 (1988).
7. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (question-
ing whether children withdrawn from high school by Amish parents had any opportunity for free
choice).
8. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794-95 n.34 (1976) (deeming
corporate shareholders freer to vote with their feet among investments than employees are among
jobs).
9. The modern First Amendment doctrine of "freedom of association" was forged to protect such
black civil rights organizations. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)
(protecting anonymity of NAACP membership lists); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom
of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
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untary group affiliations is subject to attack in the name of equality, vol-
untary associations are protected in the name of liberty. Equal protection
doctrine shields individuals from disadvantages stemming from some (but
not all) involuntary group memberships. The paradigm case is race; gen-
der, alienage, and illegitimacy have been deemed likewise suspect, al-
though to a lesser extent. The basic principle is that such "immutable"
characteristics shall not be bases for lawmaking unless the state can fur-
nish extremely strong justification. This principle is in keeping with the
general hostility of liberal individualism to the allocation of political for-
tune on the basis of statuses over which one has no control.
In contrast, current constitutional law protects voluntary associations.
Under prevailing First and Fourteenth Amendment liberty and privacy
doctrines, the state may neither compel nor penalize membership in such
groups, nor may it determine the agendas they pursue, without strong
justification.10
Insulating voluntary associations from intrusion by the state serves a
hybrid of individualist and communitarian ends. As political theorists
from Tocqueville to the present have suggested, intermediate voluntary
groups furnish one answer to the problems of large scale and heterogene-
ity in the United States. Large scale makes a classic liberal individualist
model of politics unworkable, because autonomous, self-interested, free-
willing citizens cannot directly participate in and control political out-
comes. On the other hand, heterogeneity of national, racial, religious, and
other social identities and traditions precludes classic communitarianism,
for no longer can civil society be coextensive with the state. Intermediate
organizations fill the gap between individuals and the state. On the one
hand, they are vehicles that reflect and amplify individual members' inter-
ests. On the other, they are subnational bases for social integration and
the formation of ideals and beliefs. They are both instrumental and form-
ative, both mechanical and organic, both conveyor belts for interests and
nurturing grounds for values."' In short, as Justice Brennan put it, volun-
tary associations serve as "critical buffers between the individual and the
power of the State."
'1 2
10. The promotion of equality or the prevention of harm may amount to such justification. See,
e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that policy of ending sex discrim-
ination justified state intrusion upon male-only club membership policy).
11. See, e.g., 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 485-88 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner
eds. 1966); McConnell, The Public Values of the Private Association, in NOMOS XI: VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS 147, 149 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969) (noting that private associations not
only facilitate government but also "build norms and patterns of behavior"); Note, Developments in
the Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 987-89
(1963); Stewart, Book Review, Organizational Jurisprudence, 101 HARV. L. REv. 371, 380-84
(1987) (describing alternative normative conceptions of intermediate organizations); Wolff, Beyond
Tolerance, in A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 3, 36 (R.P. Wolff, B. Moore, Jr. & H. Marcuse
eds. 1965) (describing pluralist theory of intermediate organizations as uniting "'liberal' principles
and 'conservative' sociology").
12. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 619.
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Prevailing constitutional doctrine thus views involuntary group mem-
bership as presumptively irrelevant to public ends. "Immutable" charac-
teristics may be reflected in law-for example, in affirmative action
plans-only to the extent necessary to hasten their withering away.13 Vol-
untary group membership, in contrast, is meant to live on and flourish,
subject only to limited state intrusion.
II. INTERMEDIATE GROUPS IN THE REPUBLICAN REVIVAL
Sunstein and Michelman reverse the traditional constitutional distinc-
tion. While they agree, of course, that involuntary group membership can-
not be the basis for imposing disadvantage, they would each "make a vir-
tue of [social group] plurality. ' 14 Indeed, Sunstein would go so far as to
institutionalize involuntary group cleavages in politics by adopting pro-
portional representation for "[b]lacks, women, the handicapped, gays and
lesbians" and similar groups. 5
In contrast, Sunstein and Michelman accord little value to the flourish-
ing of private voluntary groups. Either they disparage such groups as rov-
ing bands of self-interested Hobbesean rent-seekers that merely amplify
individual desires, or they seek to assimilate such groups to republicanism
by depicting them as extra-political vehicles for republican deliberation or
dialogue. 6
This section argues, first, that Sunstein's and Michelman's embrace of
involuntary-group heterogeneity deeply undermines the republican model,
and second, that their account of voluntary groups undervalues the impor-
tance of keeping such groups private and outside the state.
A. Republicanism and Involuntary Groups
Sunstein and Michelman argue that republicanism should acknowledge
and affirm differences in involuntary group perspectives. Deliberation in
the new republican regime will not be the province of a privileged elite
likely to confuse its own partial self-interest with the public good. Rather,
13. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion of Black-
mun, J.) ("In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other
way."); Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative
Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. Rav. 78 (1986) (describing the Supreme Court's reliance on remedial
justifications for affirmative action).
14. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1528; see Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539, 1574-75 (1988).
15. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1585; see id. at 1588-89. Sunstein admits that, to a republican,
proportional representation is a "second-best solution." Id. at 1588. In fact, it seems even less republi-
can than that. For one thing, republicanism's requisite political equality and independence, see id. at
1552-53, is compromised if representatives are bound to identifiable partial constituencies as propor-
tional representation would require. More important, to admit disadvantaged groups themselves to the
chamber is to concede that stake matters to political arguments and outcomes, and that the powerful
may be more moved by confrontation than moralized by reason. But these are premises of "plural-
ism," not republicanism; they suggest that politics is a matter of bargaining from self-interest after all.
16. See infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
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the republican revival will replace the war of all against all with dialogue
among all about all-including those involuntary groups that have been
traditionally disadvantaged in politics. If those groups cannot actually be
included in the deliberations-as they would in Sunstein's proportional
representation scheme-they are to be evocatively included by legislators'
or judges' empathy with their perspectives."7
Why do Sunstein and Michelman forego the more straightforward re-
publican approach of treating such group "perspectives" as undesirable
contingencies to be transcended in favor of a single universal, public-
regarding point of view? Heterogeneity of "perspective" would appear to
bristle with just as much danger of faction and partiality as the heteroge-
neity of interests, preferences, and desires that Hobbesean rent-seekers
trade on and republicanism condemns.
There are two possible answers. The first is that Sunstein and
Michelman see current differences in involuntary-group perspectives as
the eradicable products of existing differences in power. This view would
align them with those who interpret the equal protection clause as a ban
on subordination, mandating that, where serious background inequalities
in power divide social groups, they be treated differently rather than the
same. 8 Under this approach, affirmative action programs for blacks and
women not only do not violate the equal protection clause, but may be
constitutionally compelled. Similarly, a black-dominated school board's
choice to exclude whites from its neighborhood schools would not now
violate equal protection even if a white-dominated school system's segrega-
tion policy would do so. And women could exclude men from their down-
town athletic clubs while men must admit women to theirs.
The second possible answer is that Sunstein and Michelman see differ-
ences in involuntary group perspectives as ineradicable, even if power ine-
qualities could be reduced. This view would align them with those who
view perspectival differences among involuntary groups not as the unfor-
tunate residue of history, but rather as inevitable or normatively desira-
ble.1" Under this approach, equality would not require sameness or assim-
.ilation, but rather shifts in perspective. For example, if pregnancy were
viewed through women's perspective rather than through the "male
17. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1574-75; Michelman, supra note 6, at 1530.
18. See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976);
Strauss, The Myth of Color-Blindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99 (noting that in a racially unequal
world, there can be no race-blind decisions, but only a choice among race-conscious ones); C. MACK-
INNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987).
19. See, e.g., D. BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 102-22 (1987) (suggesting that black-run
schools may do more to advance racial equality than their integrated counterparts); C. GILLIGAN, IN
A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987) (advocating that decisionmakers take perspectives other than
their own into account); Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship, 99 ETHICS (forthcoming 1989) (endorsing a "heterogeneous public" reflecting "group
differentiation").
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norm" of a work life uninterrupted by stints as an incubator, then a law
giving pregnant women more time off from work than men, without loss
of benefits, would not violate equality so much as vindicate it."
On either the unequal-power theory or the multiple-perspective theory,
republican dialogue appears unworkable. For both these theories suggest
that involuntary group members conceive of the good differently depend-
ing on their different histories, experiences, needs, and attributes. Such
fractures in perspective will mar agreement on an overarching common
good. If group values are not all commensurable on a common scale, poli-
tics will amount to trading among incommensurable positions after all.
To be sure, the unequal-power theory may be more hospitable to re-
publicanism in the long run. If power inequalities were reduced, perspec-
tival differences might decrease along with them. But in the meantime,
dialogue across the chasms separating differently situated groups will
surely be harder than republicans think. Moreover, the course of power
equalization is unpredictable, and new inequalities may arise to replace
the old, perpetuating the problem.
The multiple-perspective approach, however, is not even theoretically
compatible with republicanism. For under this approach, differences in
perspective are here to stay. The color-blind and sex-blind millenium will
not arrive, nor should we want it to.2 ' For all to see the world through the
same set of epistemological lenses would be undesirable. But if that is so,
we will never be one big republican community-not even in an ideal
world.
This is not to deny that lawmakers should try to transcend their own
"perspectives" in order to take others' into account, nor that communica-
tion may take place across involuntary-group boundaries. But differences
in involuntary-group power and perspective at the very least make it un-
likely that politics will ever tend toward undominated dialogue, as
Michelman envisions, or yield uniquely correct outcomes, as Sunstein sug-
gests. 2 Affirming ongoing differences among involuntary groups appears
a fatal concession, undercutting the republican project of pursuing, even
aspirationally, a unitary common good.
20. See Minow, supra note 19, at 42-43.
21. An additional problem is that some differences will run deeper than "perspective." Pregnancy
is an obvious example, pending the invention of plastic wombs. See Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treat-
ment: An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. REv. 581 (1977). And even conceding the element of
social construction in disadvantages suffered by the physically disabled, see tenBroek & Matson, The
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1966), the underlying differences between
disabled and able persons may not be fully eliminated.
22. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1526-27; Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1574-75.
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B. Republicanism and Voluntary Groups
Private voluntary associations pose a threat to republican aspirations
parallel to that posed by the plurality of involuntary social groups. Again,
the problem is partiality, but in a double sense. To the extent that volun-
tary groups amplify individual wants, they embody partial rather than
universal interests or preferences. To the extent they operate as settings
for personality formation and social integration, they embody partial
rather than universal perspectives or world views. In this context, partial-
ity is the point. The partiality of voluntary associations is not meant to
wither away, even if it could; such groups are irreducibly partial, by defi-
nition. None embraces, or could embrace, everyone in the polity without
losing its identity.
This problem is one of value, not merely scale. Whereas republican
deliberation proceeds "from the point of view of everybody," 3 private as-
sociations take a narrower view. Their membership, as well as their
views, are defined by exclusion as much as inclusion. Religious communi-
ties, for example, lay different and mutually incompatible claims to uni-
versal truth; to take the point of view of everybody, including nonbe-
lievers, would destroy them.2
Private voluntary associations threaten republicanism in another sense,
too: they compete with the state for loyalty and attachment. There is an
economy of energy available for collective life, and limits must be drawn.25
We cannot be equally available for participation in family, church, and
state. Parenting and worshipping may siphon off strength from citizen-
ship. Private voluntary associations offer an alternative to government as a
vehicle for collective self-formation. To that extent, the flourishing of such
associations detracts from republican commitment to collective self-
determination in the universal rather than the particular mode.
In light of these threats, it is no surprise that the republican revival
would give private voluntary associations short shrift. Traditional republi-
canism stressed the priority of self-government in the public, universal
sphere over other possible sources of freedom and identity. And although
they have thrown militarism, fraternity, and misogyny overboard, Sun-
stein and Michelman have not abandoned the tradition on this score.28 If
23. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1570.
24. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
free exercise challenge by fundamentalist Christians to compulsory assignment of "secular humanist"
texts at public school), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
25. Cf Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984)
(describing "the economy of virtue" available for "republican moments").
26. See, e.g., Michelman, Politics or Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?,
13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 509 (1979) ("Politics is a process-not the only one, but an indispensa-
ble one-for making the self-defining choices that constitute our moral freedom."); Sunstein, Routine
and Revolution, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 869, 877 (1987) (approving the republican view that "politics is
valued above other activities").
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politics is the best vehicle for collective self-definition, there is reason to
distrust the autonomy of competing private vehicles.
Sunstein and Michelman have three possible responses. The first is a
policy of containment. This approach would contract the realm of collec-
tive self-definition outside the state by increasing regulation of private as-
sociations and decreasing their constitutional protection. No more speech
rights for corporations27 or other vehicles for aggregated wealth."8 Newly
heightened scrutiny for garden-variety socioeconomic legislation of the
kind the Court has left alone since 1937 in order to smoke out the lobbies
and unions that are behind it.29 Sharper skepticism toward freedom of
association claims; cases like Roberts v. United States Jaycees0 would be-
come the rule rather than the exception.
A second response to the threat posed by voluntary groups is a policy of
colonization. Instead of contracting the realm of private association,
republicans could leave it in place but appropriate it for republican ends.
This is Sunstein's approach when he writes that "[c]itizenship, understood
in republican fashion, does not occur solely through official organs," but
also through private associations, which can "serve as outlets" for "delib-
eration," "community," and "civic virtue."31 This is likewise Michelman's
approach when he includes even "voluntary organizations," "clubs," and
"street life" among the forums of republican debate.32
On this view, voluntary associations serve as private boot camps for
citizenship. Their principal value to republicans is a scale consonant with
greater participation, feelings of attachment, and common commitment
than is possible in the hopelessly oversized state.33 Family and home, for
example, serve not as havens from the dominant culture, but as vehicles
for teaching the primacy of the common good, writ small.
27. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
28. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
29. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1579; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 69-72 (1985) (urging reversal of decisions applying deferential rational-basis re-
view to economic legislation involving wealth transfers-for example, United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (upholding pension scheme benefiting incumbent union members
over other retired railroad workers)).
30. 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (rejecting freedom of association claim by sexually segregated private
business dub).
31. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1573; cf. Sandel, Democrats and Community, THE NEW REPUB-
uc, Feb. 22, 1988, at 20-21 (finding seeds of republican potential in existing institutions of "family
and neighborhood, religion and patriotism").
32. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1531. Michelman does not explain the relationship of these
groups to the state, but he notes that they may influence "judicial agents" to realize their claims and
world views. Id. at 1530. This depiction not only strays far from the traditional republican emphasis
on participation in politics, but also appears to recreate, in diluted form, the very sort of external,
'authoritarian" influence on judges that Michelman elsewhere in his article condemns. See id. at
1520.
33. Arguments for federalism often make the same point about local governments. See I A. DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 11, at 60-62; McConnell, Book Review, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987).
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A third approach, most evident in Michelman's endorsement of "a non-
state centered" republicanism, is to expand the contours of republicanism
beyond politics to "social life at large." 4 Under this approach, voluntary
groups become not just forums for republican dialogue, but speakers in it.
Civil rights organizations, for example, help to transform the broad public
life that lies outside the formal channels of government. Extra-political
social controversy is part of republican debate.
None of these three responses is satisfactory. Under a policy either of
containment or of colonization, the virtues of private associations would be
lost. Contracting constitutional protection for voluntary groups would im-
pair their most crucial functions. Intermediate organizations not only fa-
cilitate individual self-definition and expression, but also keep the state
from replicating itself by nurturing deviance, diversity, and dissent. These
functions depend on subgroups' private status-on their detachment and
distance from the all-inclusive state.
Likewise, private voluntary groups are poor ground for republican boot
camps. They are neither civic, virtuous, nor deliberative in the republican
sense. They are too homogeneous, too partial, too differentiated. To recon-
stitute them as molecularly complex microcosms of the undifferentiated
public as a whole would be to change their character fundamentally.35
But nothing less would fit them for the republican task.
The third approach, which would treat social controversy in the broad
sense as republican dialogue, is the most compatible with existing liberal
conceptions of private association. But it is not clear what is "republican"
about this approach at all. To be linked in a common fate is not the same
as applying collective will to a common project. Moreover, to recast pri-
vate associations as participants in a common public life-however
broadly "public" is defined-is to mute their potential deviance from and
opposition to dominant norms.
Voluntary associations thus put republicans in a bind. Republicans can-
not easily embrace them because of their irreducible partiality. But repub-
licans cannot wholly reject them because they are among the only settings
for community around. Normative pluralists have it easier: they do not
mind keeping communal life fractionated and outside the state because
they think that is where it belongs.3"
34. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1531.
35. The analogy in local government law would be not to Belle Terre, the small homogeneous
suburb whose single-family zoning law was upheld by the United States Supreme Court, see Belle
Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), but to Mount Laurel, the small homogeneous suburb ordered by
the New Jersey Supreme Court to absorb its "fair share" of the less affluent, see Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
36. See N. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM 152-86 (1987).
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III. CONCLUSION
The republican revival reconceives politics and lawmaking as quests for
universal truth. Sunstein speaks of agreement on uniquely correct out-
comes; Michelman speaks less of agreement than of undominated dia-
logue. But either way, each argues that proper political deliberation pur-
sues shared normative understanding and a single common good.
Normative pluralism rejects this quest. It affirms that not only interests
but values are plural, and would protect the diversity of private associa-
tional life. Group heterogeneity is thus a problem for republicans, but a
normative pluralist good.
Sunstein and Michelman are sensitive to the problem that social hetero-
geneity poses for republicanism. They innovate on the tradition, proposing
a rainbow republicanism that would incorporate perspectival differences
of various hues. Moreover, they deny that republicanism will endanger
the diversity of private life; for example, both argue that Bowers v. Hard-
wick,17 which upheld the Georgia sodomy law, was wrongly decided on
republican grounds."'
These claims are valiant but unpersuasive. The problem with embrac-
ing heterogeneity is that the incommensurability of values among groups
may defeat the republican enterprise; painters know that to mix all the
colors of the rainbow produces mud. And the opposite result in Hardwick
is difficult to square with the republican premise of self-government. Ac-
tual majoritarian political processes can and do produce sodomy laws, for
instance because the citizenry values or purports to value potentially pro-
creative sex over other varieties. Sunstein and Michelman can reject those
processes as insufficiently deliberative or as not "committ[ed]" enough to
"social plurality" 9 only by placing highly restrictive conditions on proper
political debate. For example, they can claim that a sodomy-banning leg-
islature wrongly failed to take into account the gay male perspective-oral
and anal intercourse being potentially more central to gay male sexuality
than to that of other groups.4 0 But deciding when the perspectives of losers
in the political process should have been taken into account requires crite-
ria.41 And such criteria will turn out to look suspiciously like rights ema-
37. 478 U.S. 186.
38. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1580-81 & n.224; Michelman, supra note 6, at 1532-37.
39. See id. at 1536.
40. See Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1580 n.224 (characterizing sodomy ban as an equal protection
violation); Michelman, supra note 6, at 1532-37.
41. See, e.g., Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063, 1075-76 (1980) (distinguishing homosexuals from burglars). Michelman wants judges to
hear the voices of groups on the "margins," or of those "hitherto excluded," Michelman, supra note
6, at 1529, but he nowhere explains whether or how judges should distinguish, for example, between




nating from "above" or "outside" politics-just what the republican delib-
erative norm was meant to avoid.42
Of course, rights of privacy and voluntary association themselves should
not be embraced uncritically. Abuse and injury are intolerable even when
practiced behind home and family walls. Nominally private associations
can skew public life: for example, by excluding women from the com-
manding heights of the business lunch table or by exerting monopolistic
power in political campaigns. Group power is unequally distributed, and
many interests and values are not organized at all.43 And not all private
associations are appropriate settings for collective definition of values; for
example, it is hardly clear that business corporations should enjoy strong
rights of expression.
44
In short, there can be no disagreement with Sunstein's statement, of-
fered as a retort to "antirepublicanism," that "multiple threats are posed
by private power, including that wielded by intermediate organizations,
which are themselves a source of oppression. '45 Of course, government
must regulate private associations; the question is to what extent.46 But
one may concede the need for regulation without agreeing that the solu-
tion is to reconceive all that is social as public.
42. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1510-12 (criticizing pluralist account of rights as grounded
in transcendental or hypothetical constructs).
43. These are classic criticisms of the theory of interest-group pluralism. See Parker, The Past of
Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 223, 240-46 (1981).
44. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (distinguishing, for First
Amendment purposes, grass-roots political organizations that amplify citizens' voices from business
corporations organized to amass capital); Brudney, Business Corporations and Stockholders' Rights
Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235 (1981); Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN.
L. REV. 957 (1982).
45. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 1574.
46. "We may try to set a line dividing the internal affairs of a church or trade union from those of
its activities which affect the public at large. . . .But we must recognize that the community cannot
irrevocably part with its power to revise such grants and that it is impossible for all the parties to a
dispute to have the last word." M. COHEN, Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy,
16 J. PHIL. 673 (1919), reprinted in REASON AND NATURE 386, 397-98 (1931) (criticizing theories
of "plural sovereignty" of private associations).
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